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INTRODUCTION 
I came into the world of labor law and, derivatively, fair 
employment practice antidiscrimination law, through a 
rather roundabout process.  As a high school student, I was 
inspired by the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling declaring 
“separate but equal” unconstitutional in public education in 
Brown v. Board of Education,1
 
 * Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford Law School; 
Chairman of National Labor Relations Board, 1994–1998; Chairman of the 
California Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 2014–; Member of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators since 1970; Consultant to the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 1966–1967.  The author is grateful to Eric Weitz, 
Stanford Law School ‘14, for the valuable research provided in connection with 
the preparation of this article.  Erika Wayne and her first-rate Stanford Law 
Library team have been extraordinarily helpful as well.  Of course, any errors or 
deficiencies are the author’s own.  This Article is based upon a speech delivered 
on January 24, 2014, at Stanford Law School, at the Stanford Law Review-
Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Symposium: The Civil 
Rights Act at Fifty (Jan. 24–25, 2014). 
 and was convinced by 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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Thurgood Marshall’s success that a lawyer could produce real 
change in American society.  Four years later, my first-year 
Constitutional Law course deepened my interest by 
examining what the NAACP had accomplished through 
litigation prior to Brown, particularly in the 1930s and 
1940s,2 as well as some of its progeny.3
[Brown] gave me and other blacks the hope and belief that 
the law could address itself to racial injustices in this 
country and that I as a lawyer could make some 
contribution to end the old order against which my 
parents had struggled.  In their day the struggle was 
against hopeless odds—hopeless because all who 
possessed African blood were isolated, ridiculed, 
despised—and thus regarded as unfit for occupations and 
work that the white man was willing to perform. . . .  
Brown was important to all black people because it gave 
us hope that we would have our day in court—both 
literally and figuratively.
 Twenty years after 














 2. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); 
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936). 
 3. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also 
HARRY KALVEN JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).  Later I 
was able to rely on this line of authority in Washington.  See Novotel N.Y., 321 
N.L.R.B. 624 (1996); Shepherd Tissue, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 369, 373 (1998) 
(Gould, Chairman, concurring).  
 4. 120 CONG. REC. 16,229–30 (daily ed. May 22, 1974); Conversations with 
Earl Warren, STAN. LAW., Summer 1974, at 9.  For a somewhat different 
perspective, see generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007). 
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Though I followed assiduously the debate5 on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957—the first civil rights legislation enacted 
since Reconstruction—and subsequently the Civil Rights Act 
of 1960, my growing realization that inequities in the 
workplace were a vital part of this struggle drove my career 
towards labor law.6  My experience in this field provided me 
with an early exposure to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and led to my involvement with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission at its inception.7
I have always believed that labor law is a critically 
important prerequisite to employment discrimination law 
because of certain common characteristics shared by the 
National Labor Relations Act and Title VII, the former 
influencing the latter thirty years later.  In the first place, the 
concept of unlawful employment practices in Title VII closely 
 
 
 5. I observed at the time that President Eisenhower expressed relative 
indifference or lack of knowledge about his own proposed bill: 
 
Q. Mr. Reston: Mr. President, in light of that, would you be willing to 
see the bill written so that it specifically dealt with the question of 
right to vote rather than implementing the Supreme Court decision on 
the integration of schools? 
 
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would not want to answer this in detail, 
because I was reading part of that bill this morning, and there were 
certain phrases I didn’t completely understand. So, before I made any 
more remarks on that, I would want to talk to the Attorney General 
and see exactly what they do mean. 
 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference (July 3, 1957), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10828 [hereinafter 
Eisenhower News Conference].  General Eisenhower had earlier testified 
against President Truman’s desegregation of the armed forces in 1948.  
Universal Military Training: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 
80th Cong. 986–1013 (1948) (statement of Dwight D. Eisenhower, General of 
the U.S. Army). 
 6. See William B. Gould IV, Recollections of Kurt Hanslowe—A Dedication 
to Professor Kurt Löwus Hanslowe, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 929 (1984).  My 
initial Labor Law course was taken with Professor Bertram Willcox at Cornell 
Law School, but my first year paper on Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1959), in Legal Research brought 
me to Professor Hanslowe’s attention.  He recommended me to the United 
Automobile Workers in Detroit in 1960, where I was employed as a law clerk 
that summer, and subsequently as Assistant General Counsel in 1961–1962. 
 7. This took place in the form of being a consultant to the EEOC on 
seniority issues under collective bargaining agreements, and drafting a report 
dealing with this subject while acting as a Conciliator in Title VII cases in 
1966–1967, two of the first three years of Title VII and the EEOC. 
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resembles unfair labor practices in the NLRA.  Second, both 
statutes create an expert administrative agency—the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—though, as 
noted below, they possess different enforcement roles.  Third, 
the litigation that has emerged about how discrimination is 
proved under the NLRA8 and Title VII9 contain analytical 
similarities.  Finally, both statutes contain provisions 
relating to remedies that, as the Supreme Court has noted, 
are nearly identical.10
Like the National Labor Relations Act,
 
11 the Supreme 
Court has interpreted Title VII to permit a finding of 
discrimination without intent as a prerequisite, in the 
landmark Griggs v. Duke Power holding,12 which provided a 
disparate impact model for antidiscrimination law.  But some 
members of the Court in recent years have begun to express 
skepticism about this precedent.13
 
 8. See e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); cf. Frick 
Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (1995) (Gould, Chairman, concurring).  
  Whatever the numerous 
difficulties with Title VII today (below I allude to an 
inhospitable judiciary, particularly at the trial level, as well 
as regrettable Supreme Court interpretations of 
antidiscrimination law involving the compatibility of 
collective bargaining seniority contract provisions with Title 
VII, and other issues), its influence has been substantial and 
enduring.  It was the first such national law of its kind in the 
industrialized world, its enactment predating legislative 
 9. For example, for the disparate treatment cases, see St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973).  The disparate impact principle is contained in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and subsequently appeared in cases such as Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); and University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 10. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848–49 
(2001). 
 11. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers v. 
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
 12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  For its application to 
sex-discrimination prohibitions, see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977). 
 13. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); id. at 594 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 596 (Alito, J., concurring). 
GOULD FINAL 5/23/2014  12:43 PM 
2014] TITLE VII AT FIFTY 373 
initiatives in the United Kingdom,14 and the Continent of 
Europe,15 which looked at the American experience before 
they addressed some of the same issues.  Its basic tenets have 
stretched out to newer legislation on age,16 disability,17 and 
sexual orientation18 discrimination, and have impacted the 
law governing sexual harassment19 and wrongful discharge.20
Here I discuss: (1) the background of antidiscrimination 
law; (2) the debate about the best administrative and judicial 
processes to handle antidiscrimination complaints; (3) the 
dispute arising out of the relationship between seniority and 
the law; (4) the emergence of front pay as a remedy for future 
compensation losses suffered by the victims of discrimination; 
and (5) the substantial changes in attitude by plaintiffs and 
defendants toward jury trials.  I conclude by celebrating the 
role of the law in reducing discrimination, and yet I express 
 
 
 14. Race Relations Act, 1965, c. 73 (U.K.); Race Relations Act, 1968, c. 71 
(U.K.); cf. William B. Gould, No Coloured Need Apply, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 22, 
1968, at 14. 
 15. See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: 
Employment Cases in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 115 (2010). 
 16. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 
(1967); see George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1995).  Recent 
research has helped contradict the notion that older individuals remaining in 
the workforce limits job opportunities for younger workers, and instead suggests 
that the opposite may be true.  See Alicia H. Munnell & April Yanyuan Wu, 
Issue in brief, Are Aging Baby Boomers Squeezing Young Workers Out of Jobs?, 
CTR. FOR RET. RES.OF BOS. COLL., No. 12-18, Oct. 2012.  
 17. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
(1990). 
 18. See Jeremy W. Peters, Bill Advances to Outlaw Discrimination Against 
Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at A10 (discussing proposed federal legislation, 
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act).  On the state-level, twenty-one states 
and the District of Columbia have adopted laws prohibiting discrimination in 
the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation.  See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A 
PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 390 (5th ed. 2013). 
 19. Of course, Title VII has subsumed the law against sexual harassment.  
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 
U.S. 17 (1993).  The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991 highlighted 
the lack of effective remedies for sexual harassment, which Congress 
subsequently created in the form of compensatory and punitive damages as part 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See GOULD, supra note 18, at 393; William B. 
Gould IV, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at 14. 
 20. E.g., Phillips v. St. Mary Reg'l Med. Ctr., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 781 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (relying on Title VII as source of public policy for wrongful discharge 
claim); cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (noting 
that Title VII does not preempt or supplant state law causes of action). 
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caution and concern about the persistence of racist attitudes 
expressed sometimes by political leaders and those closely 
affiliated with them. 
I. THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY 
The struggle for equal employment opportunity in the 
past century has its roots in A. Philip Randolph and his 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.21  As the trade union 
movement continued to grow after both the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Great Depression,22 Randolph and the 
Brotherhood cried out about black workers being left behind 
and began the March on Washington Movement.23  As the 
clouds of World War II were on the horizon, requiring both 
labor unity and universal commitment to the war effort, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt is purported to have told Mr. 
Randolph that Randolph needed to “make him” act.24  When 
Randolph did so through a threatened march on Washington, 
D.C., in 1941, FDR fashioned Executive Order 8802 
prohibiting racial discrimination by those who contracted 
with the federal government.25  Twenty years later, the 
Order’s substantive reach was expanded by virtue of 
President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925, issued 
on March 6, 1961.26
 
 21. See generally JERVIS ANDERSON, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH; A BIOGRAPHICAL 
PORTRAIT (1st ed. 1973).  
  Kennedy’s Executive Order extended the 
obligations of contractors and subcontractors beyond a mere 
non-discrimination requirement so as to fashion an obligation 
to undertake “affirmative action” to recruit and promote 
 22. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS; A HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941 (1970). 
 23. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1977).  See generally HERBERT R. 
NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944).  Long a vocal critic of 
the labor movement on race-related issues, in later years Randolph adopted a 
more conciliatory stance.  See GOULD, supra, at 285; see also W.B. Gould, Race 
and the Unions: The Negro and Organized Labor by Ray Marshall, NEW 
LEADER, July 5, 1965, at 20–21; William B. Gould, Discrimination and the 
Unions, 14 DISSENT 564 (1967); William B. Gould, Discrimination and the 
Unions, in POVERTY: VIEWS FROM THE LEFT (Jeremy Larner & Irving Howe 
eds., 1968). 
 24. See 155 CONG. REC. H14,894-95 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. John Conyers). 
 25. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938–1943). 
 26. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 443 (1959–1963). 
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minority group workers—a duty which now arises 
independent of any finding of discrimination.27  Once the 
Johnson administration took office,28 the Department of 
Labor was given responsibility for the Order though its Office 
of Contract Compliance—but it was not until 1971, under 
Richard Nixon,29 that the federal government began to 
enforce these Orders by disbarring or cancelling the contract 
of an employer who failed to adequately recruit minority 
group workers.30
But this was not the only backdrop to Title VII prior to 
its enactment. As early as 1945, Northern states began to 
enact state fair-employment practice legislation, which later 
emerged as a contentious issue during the debates on Title 
VII.
 
31  Perhaps even more important was the development of 
litigation that established an implied duty of fair 
representation, first under the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and 
subsequently through the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) of 1935.32  In the lead case, Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad,33
 
 27. Id. 
 white unions had attempted to remove 
 28. The Johnson administration’s policy relating to inequality was broader 
than Title VII, consisting of a “war on poverty.”  See Annie Lowrey, 50 Years 
Later, War on Poverty is a Mixed Bag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at 1.  See 
generally ROBERT CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF 
POWER (2012). 
 29. This coincided with the Nixon administration’s aggressive stance 
against construction unions in the Philadelphia Plan and its progeny.  See 
GOULD, supra note 23, at 101–02; see also William Gould, Moving the Hard-
Hats In, NATION, Jan. 8, 1973, at 41; William B. Gould, Blacks and the General 
Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1971, at 23. 
 30. Much of the preceding paragraph is taken from GOULD, supra note 23, 
at 33. 
 31. See generally PAUL H. NORGREN & SAMUEL E. HILL, TOWARD FAIR 
EMPLOYMENT (1964); Paul H. Norgren, Government Contracts and Fair 
Employment Practices, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (1964).  Twenty-two states 
enacted fair-employment practices laws prior to 1964: New York and New 
Jersey (1945); Massachusetts (1946); Connecticut (1947); New Mexico, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, and Washington (1949); Alaska (1953); Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Pennsylvania (1955); Colorado and Wisconsin (1957); California and Ohio 
(1959); Delaware (1960); Illinois, Kansas, and Missouri (1961); Hawaii and 
Indiana (1963). In addition, employment discrimination was made a 
misdemeanor in Idaho (1961), Iowa (1963), and Vermont (1963).  William M. 
Landes, The Effect of State Fair Employment Laws on the Economic Position of 
Nonwhites, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 578, 578 n.1 (1967).  
 32. Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, Local No. 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 
1955), rev’d, 350 U.S. 943 (1955). 
 33. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
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black workers from the railways, particularly as the advent of 
the diesel engine converted the black fireman’s job away from 
something that was dirty and unpleasant into featherbedded 
work that was easy if not nonexistent.  In Steele, the Court 
held that unions operating as exclusive bargaining agents for 
all employees in an appropriate unit must represent them 
fairly, without hostility or discrimination.34  The Court, albeit 
utilizing constitutional analysis that has since been 
abandoned,35 assumed that if Congress could be deemed to 
have bestowed broad bargaining authority upon unions which 
engaged in hostile action toward blacks, they would have, in 
effect, sanctioned the practice of racial discrimination, thus 
producing grave constitutional questions.36  The Court, 
however, found an implied statutory duty of fair 
representation and thus avoided the constitutional issues.37
Steele emphasized that a strike was the minority’s only 
recourse when an exclusive representative of the majority 
ignored minority interests, and that resort to such self-help 





 34. See id. at 204. 
  There were limitations in Steele, not the least of 
 35. Id. at 198–99 (“[If] the Act confers this power on the bargaining 
representative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate 
statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. . . . But we 
think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a labor 
union . . . to represent the craft, did not intended to confer plenary power upon 
the union to sacrifice . . . rights of the minority in the craft, without imposing on 
it any duty to protect the minority.”); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163 (1972).  In this period, the Court also began to retreat from federal 
constitutional protection.  Compare Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551 (1972).  See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf. 
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. 
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); 
Fashion Valley Mall LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2007); Ralph’s Grocery 
Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 290 P.3d 1116 (Cal. 
2012). 
 36. Justice Murphy accepted this view in his concurrence.  Steele, 323 U.S. 
at 209 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[T]his constitutional issue cannot be lightly 
dismissed. The cloak of racism surrounding the actions of the Brotherhood in 
refusing membership to Negroes and in entering into and enforcing agreements 
discriminating against them, all under the guise of Congressional authority, 
still remains. No statutory interpretation can erase this ugly example of 
economic cruelty against colored citizens of the United States.”). 
 37. Id. at 202–03. 
 38. Id. at 200 (“[Industrial peace] would hardly be attained if a substantial 
minority of the craft were denied the right to have their interests considered at 
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which was the Court’s dicta that unions could exclude anyone 
from membership,39 a conclusion confirmed subsequently by 
appellate authority at the federal level.40  Though the 
National Labor Relations Board administratively remedied 
this in some respects on the very day that Title VII was 
enacted in 1964,41 Steele and its progeny42 required expensive 
and sometimes torturous litigation in courts of general 
jurisdiction, rather than an expedited administrative process.  
Although the Supreme Court was to subsequently hold that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had prohibited racial 
discrimination in employment,43 that issue was only to 
emerge as a significant matter much later.44
Thus, to recapitulate, though Title VII broke new ground, 
it had genuine antecedents.  The first of them was the 
executive orders beginning in 1941.  Second came the Steele 
decision, establishing a duty of fair representation for unions 
acting as exclusive bargaining representatives and, in so 
doing, highlighting the gaps that could be plugged in only 
 
 
the conference table and if the final result of the bargaining process were to be 
the sacrifice of the interests of the minority by the action of a representative 
chosen by the majority. The only recourse of the minority would be to strike, 
with the attendant interruption of commerce, which the Act seeks to avoid.”). 
 39. Id. at 204 (“While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor 
organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership, it does require 
the union, in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to 
represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile 
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”). 
 40. Oliphant v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359, 
363 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).  But see Betts v. Easley, 
169 P.2d 831 (Kan. 1946); James v. Marinship Corp. 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944). 
 41. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).  This analysis was derived 
from Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).  See also Miranda Fuel 
Co., Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959), enforced, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 
F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960); Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic 
Workers of America v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Richardson v. Texas 
& New Orleans R.R. Co., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Cent. of Georgia Ry. v. 
Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956).  See generally William B. Gould IV, Labor 
Law and the Negro, NEW LEADER, Oct. 12, 1964, at 10.  The Board had taken 
the position since 1945 that unions which discriminate on the basis of race could 
not use the National Labor Relations Act’s representation procedures, but 
refused to equate segregation with discrimination per se.  See Larus & Bro. Co., 
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). 
 42. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers 
Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 43. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see also Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 44. E.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); see also 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
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through legislation.  Third came legislation itself in the form 
of state fair-employment practices statutes just as World War 
II came to an end. 
II. TITLE VII AND THE DEBATE SURROUNDING ITS PASSAGE 
Although proposals for fair employment legislation had 
been made as early as 1948 under President Harry S. 
Truman, it would take more than a decade before the political 
climate demanded action.  The early 1960s was a dangerous 
collision course of civil rights demonstrations, hoses, police 
dogs, and “Bull” Connor’s insistence that the South truly 
meant it when it said “Never” to integration of the races.  As 
sit-ins and “freedom rider” demonstrations unfolded in the 
early 1960s,45 by the summer of 1963 policymakers began to 
engage in a serious discussion about civil rights legislation 
relating to employment.  It was June 1963 when President 
Kennedy proposed legislation in the wake of the 
demonstrations in Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and 
said: “Who among us would be content to have the color of his 
skin changed, and stand in his place?  Who among us would 
then be content with the counsels of patience and delay?”46
Both prior and subsequent to the debate about detailed 
civil rights legislation, the 1960s also saw many workers’ 
strikes and slowdowns unauthorized by unions, known as 
wildcat work stoppages, with a variety of civil rights 
demands.
 
47  Demonstrations taking place in major cities such 
as San Francisco,48 Seattle,49 Detroit,50 Chicago,51
 
 45. See ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1964); William B. Gould IV, Review: Portrait of a Decade by 
Anthony Lewis, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 12, 1965, at 767.  See generally TAYLOR 
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63 (1989); 
TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–65 (1999); 
TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68 
(2007) 
 and 
 46. LEWIS, supra note 45, at 193; see also GOULD, supra note 23, at 15.  
Much of the preceding paragraph and subsequent paragraphs is taken from the 
same. 
 47. See William B. Gould IV, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon 
Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); cf. NLRB v. Tanner 
Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. 
Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
 48. E.g., Carl Nolte, Sit-In at Hotel Sparked City’s Civil Rights Era, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 1, 2014, at A1; Hotel Emp’rs Ass’n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966); cf. 
Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50. 
 49. William B. Gould, The Seattle Building Trades Order: The First 
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Pittsburgh,52 sometimes led to agreements and controversies 
in arbitration about them.53
But notwithstanding President Eisenhower’s previously 
expressed reservations about the suitability of law to address 
race-relations disputes,
 
54 the consensus amongst those who 
sought change was that law was critical in breaking down 
racial inequality and necessary to promote fairness.  As the 
demand for legislation grew, one of the first areas of debate 
involved the structure through which rights could be 
adjudicated and remedies enforced.  Civil rights proponents 
assumed the model of the National Labor Relations Act and 
the National Labor Relations Board was the ideal.55
 
Comprehensive Relief Against Employment Discrimination in the Construction 
Industry, 26 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1974). 
  When 
 50. See GOULD, supra note 23, at 180, 274, 388–93 (discussing the Dodge 
Revolutionary Union Movement in Detroit). 
 51. GOULD, supra note 23, at 303–09. 
 52. Id. at 309. 
 53. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); 14 Penn Plaza v. 
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); William B. Gould IV, Labor Arbitration of 
Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969); 
William B. Gould IV, A Half Century of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Fifty Years of 
Ironies Squared, in ARBITRATION 2010: THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY AT 50: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS (Paul D. Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie eds., 2011); David Gregory & 
Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the 
Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 429 (2010).  Some special arbitration procedures reflecting Title VII 
standards were placed in collective bargaining agreements.  See, e.g., Basic 
Vegetable Prods., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60 (1975) (Gould, Arb.); 
Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1109 (1982) (Gould, Arb.). 
 54. At a 1957 press conference, commenting on Governor Orval Faubus’s 
use of the Arkansas National Guard to prevent black students from integrating 
Little Rock’s Central High School, President Eisenhower criticized “these people 
who believe you are going to reform the human heart by law,” and spoke of 
“strong emotions” on the other side, and of “people that see a picture of the 
mongrelization of the race. . . . We are going to whip this thing in the long run 
by Americans being true to themselves, and not merely by law.”  Robert Shogan, 
Book Mark: Is Eisenhower to Blame for Civil Rights Explosion?, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 25, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/opinion/op-1214_1_ 
eisenhower-civil-rights; see also President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News 
Conference (Oct. 30, 1957), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb 
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10943 (“We just simply cannot solve [the problem] 
completely just by fiat or law and force. This is a deeper human problem than 
that.”); President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference (Sept. 3, 1957), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10877 (“[T]ime and again 
 . . . [I] have argued that you cannot change people’s hearts merely by laws.”); 
see supra note 5. 
 55. See David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair 
Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights: 
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President Truman initially advocated for fair employment 
practices legislation—proposals propounded as a plank in the 
1948 Democratic Party platform but never able to overcome 
filibusters in 1949—the proposals provided cease-and-desist 
authority to a newly created administrative agency.56  Under 
such an approach, hearings conducted before administrative 
law judges, appealable to both the agency itself as well as the 
courts, would nonetheless produce compliance in many cases 
before the process was exhausted.  Thus, a path toward 
redress presided over by an expert agency would be relatively 
expeditious, and informal and economical as well.  Because 
this was viewed to be superior to time-consuming and 
relatively expensive litigation in unsympathetic and inexpert 
courts of general jurisdiction, liberal supporters of civil rights 
legislation rallied in support of this approach.57
The underlying assumption was that these 
administrative procedures, while ultimately providing for and 
relying upon enforcement by the courts when a responding 
party resisted the agency’s cease-and-desist order,
 
58 would be 
self-enforcing in many instances, and would provide relatively 
easy access for parties that found the judicial process time-
consuming and expensive (laypeople can represent 
themselves as well as parties before the Board59).  Under the 
National Labor Relations Act itself, parties that file unfair 
labor practices charges have free counsel with the Board’s 
General Counsel bearing the expense of prosecution 
throughout the administrative process,60
 
1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1081–84 (2011). 
 a feature hardly 
insignificant for both impecunious and average income 
workers.  On the other hand, civil rights proponents were 
always concerned with another feature of the NLRA 
administrative process, i.e., under the Act, the General 
Counsel has near-plenary authority to screen out what are 
deemed to be non-meritorious charges by refusing to issue a 
 56. E.g., The Text of President Truman’s Message on Civil Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1948, at 22 (advocating for the creation of a permanent Fair 
Employment Practice Commission with substantive authority to prevent 
employment discrimination). 
 57. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 55, at 1085–86. 
 58. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (2006). 
 59. See NLRB, RULES AND REGULATIONS—PART 102 § 102.38, at 16, 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/rules-regulations. 
 60. Cf. United Auto. Workers Local 283 v. NLRB, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). 
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complaint.61
Although adopted by a House Judiciary Subcommittee, 
the NLRA cease-and-desist authority was not included within 
the legislative package that emerged from the House 
Judiciary Committee.  Instead, the Committee gave the new 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to 
bring suits in federal court challenging employment 
discrimination.
  This framework posed, then and now, potential 
harm to blacks, minorities, and women who had been 
excluded from decision-making for so long. 
62  This provision passed the House but stalled 
in the Senate as a result of the Republican-Southern 
Democrat filibuster threat, which had provided for the burial 
of fair employment practice legislation ever since the 1948 
campaign.  Out of this impasse came negotiations between 
Senator Hubert Humphrey and the conservatives, and the 
Dirksen-Mansfield amendments to the statute, which had the 
effect of lifting the filibuster threat in the spring of 1964.63
The Dirksen-Mansfield amendments to Title VII were a 
compromise that preserved the state role of enforcement by 
requiring a complaining party to take a charge to the state 
agency before proceeding to the EEOC itself.
 
64  The 
amendments contradicted the NLRA policy, which ousted 
state jurisdiction wherever the NLRA could apply.65  Thus, 
tensions with state labor relations boards have been 
historically minimized by virtue of the doctrine of preemption, 
through which their authority is constitutionally sidelined.66
 
 61. E.g., NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 
(1987); United Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966). 
  
On the other hand, state fair employment practices 
commissions had existed for some period of time and were 
thought, by emphasizing conciliation, to facilitate “soft 
settlements” that did little to remedy discrimination because 
of the fact that settlements were frequently negotiated 
 62. This information can be found in GOULD, supra note 23, at 39. 
 63. See TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO 
PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
(2014). 
 64. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). 
 65. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 66. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 
(1959).  Cf. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 
714 (1963) (finding that state anti-discrimination law was not preempted by 
federal law). 
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without a full investigation and factual support.67
Although the Dirksen-Manfield amendments were 
essential in the passage of Title VII, in the process the role of 
the EEOC was altered so as to provide it with little-to-no 
independent enforcement capability.  The authority of the 
new five-member Commission was to investigate, find 
reasonable cause or no reasonable cause to believe that 
discrimination was taking place, and attempt to conciliate.  
The Commission had no authority to alter behavior in any 
other way, and could not issue orders or, as the House had 
initially provided, proceed to court.  Thus, the Commission 
was, in Professor Michael Sovern’s words, “a poor, enfeebled 
thing.”
 
68  The second Chairman of the Commission (FDR Jr. 
was the first), Stephen Schulman, colorfully described the 
EEOC’s enforcement role in 1967: “We’re out to kill an 
elephant with a fly gun.”69
The EEOC, however, was not entirely toothless.  The 
process of issuing reasonable cause findings carried with it a 
role comparable to that of the NLRB in connection with the 
writing of decisions and formulation of legal rationale, and 
thus ultimately led to formulating key positions in such 
issues as seniority, testing, sex discrimination, maternity 
leave, and state protective laws.
 
70  In the early days of the 
statute, particularly in 1965-1966, the EEOC’s decisions and 
guidelines established much of the framework for federal 
court decisions that flowed from litigation.  Moreover, the 
Commission played an important role in dramatizing 
discrimination by holding public hearings, a practice engaged 
in by both Chairman Clifford Alexander and, particularly, 
Chairman William H. Brown III.  This brought them criticism 
from Senators McClellan and Dirksen for putting undue 
pressure on business and labor.71
As a result of the EEOC’s limited enforcement authority, 
and although the 1964 legislation did give the Attorney 
 
 
 67. See GOULD, supra note 23, at 39.  The New York fair-employment 
commission in particular played a noteworthy role.  Id. 
 68. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT 205 (1966); see also GOULD, supra note 23, at 39. 
 69. James P. Gannon, Uphill Bias Fight: After Faltering Start, Agency 
Readies Attack on Job Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 1. 
 70. GOULD, supra note 23, at 40. 
 71. Much of the preceding paragraph is taken from GOULD, supra note 23, 
at 40. 
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General authority to institute suits where there was a 
“pattern or practice” of discrimination,72 the majority of the 
burden of enforcement fell in the hands of individuals 
authorized by the legislation to sue as private-party plaintiffs.  
This became a most important avenue for civil rights 
enforcement, as the Supreme Court deemed a plaintiff not to 
be acting “for himself alone” but rather as a “private attorney 
general” who puts on “the mantle of the sovereign” in the 
public interest.73  This led the courts to take the view that 
discrimination claims, though initiated by an employee for 
whom “past due wages may be tiny,” could warrant a “full 
scale inquiry” into employment practices that would 
otherwise go unremedied because of a divide-and-conquer or 
“resist-and-withdraw” technique.74  Class actions filed under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were utilized 
considerably,75 although ultimately circumscribed in this 
century.76
III. 1972 AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII: A SECOND LOOK AT 
EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
 
When Congress had the second crack at employment 
discrimination law in 1972 through new amendments to Title 
VII, a debate quite different from that of 1964 emerged.  The 
Nixon administration then favored EEOC court actions 
rather than cease-and-desist authority of the type that the 
NLRB possessed.  Liberals favored the latter, and the debate 
assumed a liberal-versus-conservative divide.  But at this 
point, and in the years to come, the question of which of the 
two alternatives would be more effective by no means 
provided a clear-cut answer.77
 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2012). 
 
 73. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (Title 
II); Jenkins v. United Gas Co., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968) (Title VII); 
GOULD, supra note 23, at 53 & n.2. 
 74. Jenkins, 400 F.2d at 33. 
 75. E.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Alabama, 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 76. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  But see Dustin 
Massie, Too Soon for Employers to Celebrate? How Plaintiffs Are Prevailing 
Post-Dukes, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 117 (2013). 
 77. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1972, at M-32 (“Superficially, 
the cease-and-desist route holds out the promise of swifter action and more 
uniform administration of the law, but experience with N.L.R.B. hearing 
examiners suggests that they do not dispose of cases more rapidly than Federal 
district judges. As for the uniformity of interpretation, the harder issues will 
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One argument, relied upon by the EEOC court-
enforcement proponents, is that a principal consideration in 
creating the NLRB and its special expertise was the lack of 
understanding and hostility of federal courts of general 
jurisdiction.  This level of judicial hostility simply did not 
apply to Title VII case in the early stages of the statute, 
particularly in the 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s.  Today, if 
one examines the posture of the Supreme Court in 
antidiscrimination cases,78 the pendulum seems to have 
swung back the other way.79  This, along with similar 
hostility on the part of the judiciary,80
 
only be settled by appeal to the Supreme Court whether they originate in 
E.E.O.C. orders or in district court law suits.”); see GOULD, supra note 23, at 41. 
 undercuts some of the 
 78. E.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013); Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).  The Court’s holding in Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), though a voting case not involving 
employment, vividly illustrates how far the Court has retreated from the tenor 
of both the Brown and Griggs holdings.  See generally William B. Gould IV, The 
Supreme Court, Job Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Globalization, and 
Class Actions: Justice Ginsburg’s Term, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming May 
2014).   Even prior to recent developments, the Court’s hostility to Title VII and 
employment discrimination law manifested itself in Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); and Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U.S. 755 (1989).  These decisions induced Congress to overrule the Court in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments.  See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, The 
Law and Politics of Race: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 44 LAB. L.J. 323 (1993); 
Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification 
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 287 (1993); Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921 (1993); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response 
to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993); Daniel F. Piar, 
The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, 2001 BYU. L. REV. 305 (2001). 
 79. See generally Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and 
Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2014); Suja A. Thomas, Why 
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); Suja A. 
Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005); Suja A. 
Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003); see also Amanda Farahany & Tanya 
McAdams, Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims for Cases (Sept. 16, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326697, in which an Order was 
Issued on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in 2011 and 2012 in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 
 80. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 103, 104–05 (2008) (“[C]ases proceed and terminate less favorably 
for plaintiffs than other kinds of cases.  Plaintiffs who appeal their losses or face 
appeal of their victories again fare remarkably poorly in the circuit courts.  The 
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EEOC court-enforcement arguments. 
Yet problems abound with the NLRB cease-and-desist 
approach.  In the first place, though not very apparent at the 
time of the 1972 amendments debate, the problem of 
administrative inefficiency and delay is a feature that has 
made remedies a major element of the labor law reform 
debate, as well as proposals to streamline the administrative 
process.81  Second, beyond the problems with the NLRB itself, 
however, its relative speediness was put forward as an 
argument favoring the administrative process.  This, of 
course, was all before the advent of jury trials, which have 
begun to dominate Title VII proceedings—a phenomenon 
which makes the judicial process longer.82
Third, the NLRB primary jurisdiction and preemption 
approaches seem ill suited to antidiscrimination law, where 
individuals would be precluded from having their day in court 
by virtue of the Board’s unwillingness to move forward and 
issue a complaint through the Regional Director or General 
Counsel.  Closely tied to this problem is the sharp swings in 
the NLRB’s willingness to enforce the law,
 
83 with 
appointments of temporary duration,84
 
fear of judicial bias at both the lower and the appellate court levels may be 
discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seeking relief 
in the federal courts.”); id. at 119 (“[E]mployment discrimination plaintiffs or, 
more realistically, their lawyers are becoming discouraged with their chances in 
federal court.”); id. at 131–32 (“Today employment discrimination plaintiffs still 
must swim against a strong tide—in the federal district court and on appeal. . . .  
[D]efendants in the federal courts of appeals have managed over the years to 
reverse forty-one percent of their trial losses in employment discrimination 
cases, while plaintiffs manage only a nine percent reversal rate.  The most 
startling change in the last few years’ data is the substantial drop of almost 
forty percent in the number of employment discrimination cases in the federal 
district courts.”).  
 the most recent 
example illustration being that of the Bush Board in the early 
 81. Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the H. 
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong. (1961) (Pucinski Committee 
report).  
 82. See discussion, infra Part VI. 
 83. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS AND 
THE NLRB—A MEMOIR (2000). 
 84. Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 93 (1954); W. Willard Wirtz, New National Labor Relations Board: 
Herein of “Employer Persuasion,” 49 NW. U. L. REV. 594 (1954); cf. William B. 
Gould IV, Crippling the Right to Organize, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A25. 
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part of this century.85  Will minority interests fare well in this 
model? Notwithstanding labor’s precipitous decline in recent 
decades,86 for better or worse, both labor and management 
are able to influence the policy administration of labor law 
depending on which party is in power.87
Finally, one of the problems with NLRB remedies is the 
fact that its contempt procedures are so ill suited to the 
statutory framework, given the fact that enforcement of the 
Board’s orders is generally obtained in the circuit courts of 
appeals and that the appellate process is not accustomed to 
dealing with contempt problems.
  This is not as likely 
to be true where civil rights organizations, like the NAACP, 
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(MALDEF), or the National Organization for Women (NOW), 
are the parties affected.  They may not have the same 
institutional presence or staying power as labor and 
management under the NLRA. 
88
 
 85. See GOULD, supra note 18, at ix–x, 246–47 (discussing the Bush Board’s 
so-called “September Massacre of 2007”).  This problem culminated in New 
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S., 674 (2010), where a quorum was found to 
be lacking, and in the new constitutional recess appointment issue, see NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). 
  A major virtue of the 
EEOC enforcement avenue is to be found in the fact that 
courts of general jurisdiction (which preside over both EEOC 
and private-party actions) are particularly concerned with the 
integrity of and compliance with their own entered orders.  
Obviously, the appellate courts, taking appeals from the 
administrative law judges and NLRB decisions, do not have 
the same institutional vested interest and stake in seeing the 
 86. See generally SOLOMON BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT: AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1961); A.H. Raskin, The Big 
Squeeze on Labor Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1979, at 41; A.H. Raskin, 
The Squeeze on the Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1961, at 55; PAUL 
JACOBS, THE STATE OF THE UNIONS (1963); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR 
REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993).  
This has now begun to affect the public sector.  See Joseph E. Slater, Public-
Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189 (2012); Kenneth Glenn Dau-
Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, 
the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the 
United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407 (2012); Steven Greenhouse, 
Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at 1, 4. 
 87. See William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, 
and the State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor 
Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461 (2007). 
 88. See Florian Bartosic & Ian D. Lanoff, Escalating the Struggle Against 
Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1972). 
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order enforced.  Contempt sanctions aimed at recidivists will 
not be as effective at the appellate level. 
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SENIORITY 
PROVISIONS WITH TITLE VII 
A second debate in the early days of Title VII arose from 
disputes about seniority provisions adopted by unions and 
employers in negotiated collective bargaining agreements.  
Although provisions in collective bargaining agreements were 
far more important in the 1960s than now in 2014 given the 
dramatic decline in the trade union movement,89
At least three important issues were involved in 
litigation about the relationship between seniority provisions 
and discrimination under Title VII.  The first was the 
recognition of the disparate impact approach by the Supreme 
Court in its seminal decision Griggs v. Duke Power.
 and 
although resolved in some major respects, these disputes 
continue to have a bearing upon much of the contemporary 
litigation, and involved substantive law rather than the 
procedural framework discussed above. 
90  In 
interpreting Title VII, the Court’s disparate impact approach 
recognized that intentional discrimination was not a 
prerequisite to show a violation and establish consequent 
liability.91
 
 89. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership (Jan. 24, 
2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm. 
  Specific intent to discriminate was generally 
absent in the seniority cases—the proof of this point was to be 
found in the fact that identical seniority systems could in one 
context create Title VII liability, but in another context create 
no liability where blacks or other discriminatees were not 
part of the relevant labor market.  A seniority system might 
exist and be lawful in a remote part of North Dakota or 
Montana where no blacks were present, and yet the identical 
language could create liability in Alabama.  The key in Griggs 
was disparate impact, i.e., did the seniority system retard or 
exclude blacks in the workplace just as effectively as the 
written examinations and educational requirements did in 
Griggs? 
 90. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 91. Cf. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 
(1982) (holding that a showing of intentional discrimination was required to 
establish liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1866).  
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Second, unions had argued that any discriminatory 
practices flowing from seniority were attributable to employer 
discriminatory hiring policies.  These practices made it 
impossible or more difficult for black workers to accumulate 
the necessary seniority credits to compete effectively for the 
better-paying jobs where departmental or job-classification 
seniority was established by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Thus, those workers pushed into the less-
desirable jobs by discriminatory hiring and no-transfer 
policies could not use their seniority in bidding for the better 
ones because they had been unable to acquire the requisite 
and relevant seniority credits during the years of hiring and 
transfer discrimination. 
Third, the relationship between past discrimination prior 
to the effective date of the statute, July 2, 1965, and 
prospective practices was in play as well.  As Judge John 
Wisdom of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: 
“[O]ne of the most perplexing issues troubling the courts 
under Title VII [was] how to reconcile equal employment 
opportunity today with seniority expectations based on 
yesterday’s built-in racial discrimination.”92
All three of these seniority issues were particularly 
contentious given the fact that Senator Lester Hill of 
Alabama (which by virtue of its steel plants in Birmingham 
was more unionized than most of the Deep South) 
campaigned against the proposed law in 1963-1964 by 
arguing that blacks would take away the seniority of whites 
under fair-employment legislation.  The AFL-CIO, supporters 
of the legislation, sought to assure union members that the 





 92. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982 (5th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); GOULD, supra note 23, at 19 & 
n.10. 
  However, the definition of discrimination and 
unlawful conduct under Title VII was broad, and Senators 
Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania and Clifford Case of New 
Jersey attempted to address the tensions between seniority 
and discrimination while putting together a so-called Clark-
Case memorandum in consultation with the Department of 
 93. See AFL-CIO, CIVIL RIGHTS: FACT VS. FICTION (1964).  Much of the 
information from this paragraph can be found in GOULD, supra note 23, at 68–
70. 
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Justice.  This position, put forward as a rebuttal to Senator 
Hill, stated, in part, that “last hired—first fired seniority” 
would not be affected by Title VII.  Out of this debate 
emerged subsequently the so-called “bona fide seniority” 
proviso, which deemed seniority rules to be immune from 
Title VII unless they were “the result of an intention to 
discriminate.”94
The Clark-Case memorandum appeared weeks before the 
seniority proviso emerged as part of the Dirksen-Mansfield 
amendments.  But the ambiguity of the legislative history 
was made no more unambiguous by the proviso, i.e., the 
question of what was discriminatory or nondiscriminatory 
relating to departmental seniority systems and disputes 
between incumbent workers was not explicitly addressed. 
 
The only issue that seemed to be resolved clearly was 
that Title VII could not be interpreted to permit unemployed 
black workers to oust incumbent white employees by virtue of 
a “fictional” seniority predicated upon the period of initial 
exclusion, i.e., the amount of time that they had been barred 
from the enterprise by hiring discrimination.  The bona fide 
seniority proviso contained in section 703(h) was aimed at 
this problem—but no other, especially given the expansive 
prohibition against discrimination contained in the statute.  
Thus, seniority that would have been acquired but for 
discrimination in this context would not be recognized—it 
would be viewed as a fiction unless specific individuals 
evidenced their discriminatory exclusion from a firm on an 
individual basis. 
The fact that the hiring color bar was removed did not 
permit an unemployed black worker to come off the streets 
seeking new employment opportunities by removing current 
white employees from positions that might have been 
obtained due to previously discriminatory practices.  But this 
hypothetical was dramatically different from the problems 
that emerged in the early days of Title VII, i.e., disputes 
about the use of seniority when blacks attempted to move out 
 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of 
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”). 
GOULD FINAL 5/23/2014  12:43 PM 
390 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
of previously segregated jobs into which they had been hired 
(it was clear that hiring into such categories exclusively was 
now unlawful), and the use of seniority to obtain access to 
more-desirable jobs and to use such in progressing further up 
lines of progression inside better-paying departments or job 
classifications.  Here, seniority, while not rooted in contract,95 
was less fictional for statutory purposes given the fact that 
blacks (and sometime Latinos or women) were identifiable96
Prior to Title VII, Judge Wisdom, speaking for the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Whitfield v. United 
Steelworkers,
 
as victims of discrimination in that they had actually been 
hired into the jobs and been employed at the enterprise—and 
they had been barred from the better-paying jobs by 
prohibitions against transfers to them, which froze their 
consequent inability to accumulate relevant seniority for the 
good jobs under a system that did not recognize seniority 
acquired in the low-paying, less-desirable departments or job 
classifications. 
97
The Union and the Company made a fresh start for the 
future.  We might not agree with every provision, but they 
have a contract that from now on is free from any 
discrimination based on race.  Angels could do no more. 
 had said of a collective bargaining agreement 
denying seniority credits for black workers, which 
nonetheless opened up transfers to better paying jobs in the 
future: 
It is undeniable that negroes in Line Number 2, ambitious 
to advance themselves to skilled jobs, are at a 
disadvantage compared with white incumbents in Line 
Number 1.  This is a product of the past.  We cannot turn 
back the clock. Unfair treatment to their detriment in the 
past gives the plaintiffs no claim now to be paid back by 
unfair treatment in their favor.  We have to decide this 
 
 95. See William B. Gould IV, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The 
Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 HOWARD L.J. 1 (1967); 
William B. Gould IV, Seniority and the Black Workers—Reflections on Quarles 
and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969); George Cooper & Richard B. 
Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General 
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 
(1969). 
 96. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
 97. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). 
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case on the contract before and its fairness to all.98
I advised the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,
 
99 after acting as a Conciliator in seniority 
disputes in South Carolina and Alabama, that Title VII 
provided for prospective relief for advancing black workers 
previously locked into low-level segregated jobs and that 
Whitfield was bad law, at least under Title VII—a position 
accepted by every circuit court of appeals in the country, 
including opinions by Judge Wisdom himself!100  Indeed, 
Congress itself approved these decisions in the committee 
reports leading to the 1972 amendments.101  But the Supreme 
Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States,102 was to the contrary, stating that Congress at this 
juncture could not affirm its understanding of what the 
previous body had done in 1964.103
 
 98. Id. at 551.  The contractual practices in Whitfield were challenged under 
the duty of fair representation initially established in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
  International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters involved low-paid local city freight drivers who 
were unable to catch up while bidding for long-distance, over-
 99. See generally Gould, supra note 95.  My 1967 article was, in essence, the 
report that I had done for the Commission that same year. 
 100. Justice Marshall had it right in this respect in dissent: “Without a single 
dissent, six Courts of Appeals have so held in over 30 cases, and two other 
Courts of Appeals have indicated their agreement, also without dissent.  In an 
unbroken line of cases, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
reached the same conclusion.  And the overwhelming weight of scholarly 
opinion is in accord.”  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
378–80 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 101. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 5 & n.1 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8 & n.2 
(1971); see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 391–93 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   But see Justice Marshall’s pronouncement on behalf of a 
unanimous Court the following year: “Congress is presumed to be aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”  Lorillard v. Pons, 
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also id. at 581 (“So too, where, as here, Congress 
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can 
be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the 
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”).  Indeed, 
Congress strengthened the remedial provisions of Title VII when it was 
amended in 1972.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
 102. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 103. Id. at 354 n.39 (“[T]he section of Title VII that we construe here, 
§ 703(h), was enacted in 1964, not 1972.  The views of members of a later 
Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted after this litigation 
was commenced, are entitled to little if any weight.  It is the intent of the 
Congress that enacted § 703(h) in 1964, unmistakable in this case, that 
controls.”). 
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the-road line jobs.  Although there was no dispute that this 
inability was caused by a seniority system in which local 
drivers had been unable to accumulate seniority due to 
discriminatory hiring, Justice Stewart, speaking for the court, 
held that Title VII offered no remedy: 
Were it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case 
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale.  The heart 
of the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the 
greatest protection against layoffs, and other advantages 
to those employees who have been line drivers for the 
longest time.  Where, because of the employer’s prior 
intentional discrimination, the line drivers with the 
longest tenure are, without exception, white, the 
advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately 
to them and away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed 
employees who might by now have enjoyed those 
advantages had not the employer discriminated before the 
passage of the Act.  This disproportionate distribution of 
advantages does, in a very real sense, “operate to ‘freeze’ 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”  But both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the 
legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress 
considered this very effect of many seniority systems and 
extended a measure of immunity to them.104
It seems clear that the Clark-Case memorandum did not 
focus upon the departmental classification seniority issue of 
the early days of Title VII. Nonetheless, the Court majority 
stated that: 
 
[T]he unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make clear 
that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system 
would not be unlawful under Title VII.  As the legislative 
history shows, this was the intended result even where 
the employer’s pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites 
having greater existing seniority rights than Negroes.  
Although a seniority system inevitably tends to 
perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination in such 
cases, the congressional judgment was that Title VII 
should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and 
thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights 
of employees simply because their employer had engaged 
in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act. . . .  [W]e 
hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority 
 
 104. Id. at 349–50. 
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system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply 
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. . . .  
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this 
one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent 
employees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining 
units.  Although there seems to be no explicit reference in 
the legislative history to pre-Act discriminatees already 
employed in less desirable jobs, there can be no rational 
basis for distinguishing their claims from those of persons 
initially denied any job but hired later with less seniority 
than they might have had in the absence of the pre-Act 
discrimination. . . .  It would be as contrary to that 
mandate to forbid the exercise of seniority rights with 
respect to discriminatees who held inferior jobs as with 
respect to later hired minority employees who previously 
were denied any job.  If anything, the latter group is the 
more disadvantaged.105
But Justice Marshall, dissenting with Justice Brennan,
 
106 
had it right in this regard. His persuasive dissent noted that 
section 703(h) carved out “an exemption from [ ] broad 
prohibitions.”107
But in major respects, the genesis of what was adopted 
by the dissent, as well as the circuit courts, lives on in major 
cases since then.  In the early 1970s, prior to Teamsters, the 
courts began to award front pay for future compensation 
  The dissent found the seniority proviso 
inapplicable.  Moreover, the dissent noted that the proviso 
was focused on the attempt to exercise truly so-called 
“fictional” seniority, i.e., seniority that would have been 
accumulated by minority-group workers as they sought to 
obtain any kind of access to more desirable, better paying jobs 
rather than the transfers sought when no-promotion or 
transfer of policies had previously denied them the ability to 
accumulate requisite seniority credits.  Second, the dissent 
relied upon the above-referenced 1972 amendments, in which 
Congress has explicitly placed its imprimatur on the circuit 
court case law in its reports.  The dissent thus castigated the 
Court’s grant of “immunity” to this kind of seniority system. 
 
 105. Id. at 352–55 (emphasis added). 
 106. See generally William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court’s Labor and 
Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan’s Term, 53 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1 (1981). 
 107. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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losses in Title VII seniority cases, inasmuch as, even with the 
award of prospective seniority, the black workers affected 
could not be made whole given the fact that the job they 
might have been qualified for and entitled to was presently 
held by white workers.  What was at issue was the right of 
black workers to use seniority credits when vacancies arose—
not in connection with jobs that were currently being held by 
employees not subject to discriminatory policies.  Accordingly, 
the idea of front pay was to compensate for earnings and 
other benefits lost in the interim, as the victim of 
discrimination made his or her way up the ladder.  A 
unanimous Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, 
subsequently assumed the propriety of front pay under Title 
VII (without explaining all of the circumstances under which 
it is an appropriate remedy) and found it to be equitable relief 
under the statute rather than an element of compensatory 
damages under the 1991 amendments subject to that 
provision’s statutory cap on such damages.108  Though some of 
the judicially-crafted front pay awards preceded the 1972 
amendments,109 the Court noted that Congress expanded the 
remedies previously listed to include “any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate” and that courts had 
subsequently endorsed a broad view of front pay.110
Thus, though Teamsters has made the issue of front pay 
in seniority disputes a moot point because of its 
interpretation of the proviso—an erroneous one in my view—
the issue of compensation where equitable relief is not 
appropriate at the time of the award remains very much alive 
in other employment circumstances both in and outside the 
Title VII context.  This has been acknowledged in labor 
arbitration cases where, for instance, the collective 




 108. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). 
 or 
 109. United States v. Ga. Power Co., Civil No. 12355, 1971 WL 162 (N.D. Ga. 
June 30, 1971); cf. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 121–22 (E.D. 
Mich. 1973), rev’d in part on other grounds, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).   The author was lead counsel for plaintiffs in the 
Stamps case.  See William Wong, Lawyer William Gould Prods Courts to End 
Job Bias; His Activism Sometimes Irks Peers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1974, at 3. 
 110. See, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 
1976); EEOC v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d 579, 590 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1974).  
 111. E.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 563 (1974) (Gould, 
Arb.). 
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substantively, but where reinstatement is not an appropriate 
remedy.  Front pay compensation, however, is admittedly 
rare in labor arbitration because neither labor nor 
management are generally attracted to this kind of 
compromise.112  Now, as the Court has said, front pay may be 
appropriate in such circumstances in lieu of reinstatement 
where, for instance, there is “continuing hostility” between 
the parties or where the employee has suffered “psychological 
injuries.”113  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, enacted three years after Title VII and amended in 
1986 so as to eliminate in virtually all circumstances 
mandatory retirement, has seen the award of front pay 
utilized even more frequently where the employee is 
estimated to be near retirement.114
Again, the Supreme Court has said that front pay is 
appropriate in lieu of reinstatement, and has said that the 
Civil Rights Act authorizes those awards where they are 
made “in lieu of reinstatement.”
 
115  Ironically, 
notwithstanding the importance of reinstatement particularly 
under statutes like the National Labor Relations Act where 
the remedy is central to its orders, a substantial number if 
not the overwhelming percentage of settlements obtained 
under that Act  (and in arbitration proceedings as well) 
provide for compensation without reinstatement. In contrast 
to antidiscrimination law,116 the NLRA does not contain the 
authority to fashion punitive relief.117
 
 112. On the other hand, reinstatement without back pay remains another 
form of compromise, and where the collective bargaining agreement has been 
violated but the employee does not have clean hands seems to be well accepted. 
  But this does not affect 
 113. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853.  
 114. See, e.g., Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 
2000); Davis v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Goss 
v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Donlin v. Phillips 
Lighting N. Am. Corp. 581 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 2009); Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2004); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe R.R. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1995); Hukkanen v. Int’l Union of 
Operating Eng’rs, 3 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1993); Proctor v. Consol. 
Freightways Corp., 942 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 115. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846. 
 116. Cf. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Johnson v. Ry. 
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
 117. See Republic Steel Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); NLRB v. Seven-Up 
Bottling, 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. 
NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); 
GOULD, supra note 18, at 230. 
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front pay, and thus the General Counsel has properly 
concluded that Board settlements (as well as non-Board 
settlements where they were previously permissible) may 
include front pay along with reinstatement and thus 
constitute compensation rather than a penalty.  Accordingly, 
the Board, this past year, in part relying upon Supreme Court 
Title VII authority, held that even though front pay is not a 
remedy which the Board includes in its remedial orders, the 
General Counsel nonetheless “may approve as part of a 
voluntary settlement . . . seek informal proceedings.”118  The 
General Counsel has said that where front pay “in lieu of 
reinstatement is proposed, the offer should be communicated.  
In addition, a Region may raise the issue of front pay if the 
Region is confident that reinstatement will not be achieved 
absent litigation.”119  But the approach of the Board has thus 
far been that front pay will not be sought in formal 
proceedings—in contrast to the position of the EEOC under 
Title VII and related antidiscrimination law.120
V. JURY TRIALS 
  Nonetheless, 
perhaps, through the influence of the subsequently enacted 
antidiscrimination law (a kind of role reversal), in future 
years this will change. 
The posture of the federal courts toward Title VII today 
is appreciably different than it was in the 1960s when the 
federal courts were viewed to be overly sympathetic to Title 
VII plaintiffs.121
At the time of Title VII, it was feared that juror bias 
would undermine the effectiveness of the statute and thus 
undercut civil rights.  In part, this was foreshadowed by the 
debate relating to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, when the jury 
  The jury trial debate at the time of the 
passage of Title VII is the mirror image of this shift and one 
which is predicated upon the hostility of juries to plaintiffs. 
 
 118. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B. on 
Subject: Inclusion of Front Pay in Board Settlements to all Division Heads, 
Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, 2013 WL 154207, 
at *1 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. See Chairman Clarence Thomas, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. on 
Policy Guidance: A Determination of the Appropriateness of Front Pay as a 
Remedy Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 
1988 WL 912194, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Guidance  Oct. 25, 1988). 
 121. See supra note 80. 
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trial became a key element of debate, sometimes viewed as a 
labor versus conservative issue.  The positions in the debate, 
like the one involving administrative process, have been 
turned on its head over the past half-century. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the first piece of civil 
rights legislation seriously considered and ultimately enacted 
since Reconstruction.  It almost foundered on the jury trial 
issue, i.e., whether a jury would be provided in contempt 
cases arising out of disobedience of court decrees providing for 
black voter eligibility.  The concern was that, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that 
discrimination against jurors was unconstitutional in 1880,122 
juries, particularly in the South, were simply too hostile to 
enforce civil rights.123  Ultimately, the Jury Trial Amendment 
in 1957 would pass with then-Senator Kennedy casting his 
vote with the South, perhaps in anticipation of the 1960 
presidential election.124
The same considerations animated the Title VII debate, 
leaving unresolved congressional intent with regard to the 
jury trial issue.  Because Congress did not expressly provide 
for a jury trial in Title VII, it was left to the courts to 
determine if the right was provided implicitly, or was 
constitutionally mandated by the Seventh Amendment’s 
preservation of the right to a jury trial in civil cases.  In 
Curtin v. Loether, where compensatory and punitive damages 
were awarded under Title VIII’s prohibitions on racial 
housing discrimination, the Court in dicta noted that the 
Seventh Amendment was not presumed to be applicable to 
the NLRA, or “in administrative proceedings, where jury 
trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of 
administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere 
 
 
 122. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 123. Anthony Lewis, Senate’s Rights Bill: How It Would Operate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 1957, at 147; William S. White, Johnson Charges Nixon Distortion in 
Rights Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1957, at 1; Civil Rights—Reactions to the 
Jury Trial Amendment and the Key Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1957, at E1; 
Stevenson on Jury Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1957, at 32; The Nation—
Southern Jury Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1957, at 136. 
 124. Washington Wire—Democrats and Dixie, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 1957, 
at 2 (“We find ourselves a little uncomfortable over Presidential aspirant John 
Kennedy’s flirtation with Southern politicians.”); see also Stevenson on Jury 
Trial, supra note 123, at 32; The Nation—Southern Jury Trial, supra note 123, 
at 136.  In a receiving line for Senator Kennedy at that time, I queried him 
about his jury trial position, and he responded thoughtfully. 
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with the NLRB’s role in the statutory scheme.”125  In the 
same case, the Court spoke approvingly of lower court 
decisions holding that a jury trial was not required in an 
action for reinstatement and back pay.  The Court assumed 
that a jury trial was not applicable to cases involving 
equitable relief such as reinstatement, and also held back pay 
to be incidental to the equitable relief under both the NLRA 
and Title VII.  Said the Court: “Whatever may be the merit of 
the ‘equitable’ characterization in Title VII cases, there is 
surely no basis for characterizing the award of compensatory 
and punitive damages here as equitable relief.”126
But the Court’s reasons for denying a jury trial, 
particularly where policy-makers were concerned with juror 
bias, seemed to be undermined for a number of reasons in the 
1970s and 1980s.
  
Accordingly, in such cases a jury trial is mandated. 
127  Foremost amongst the new developments 
was the advent of common-law wrongful discharge actions in 
the 1980s, fueled in substantial part by jury trials, where 
plaintiffs relied upon juries to assess substantial damages, 
both punitive and compensatory, against defendant-
employers perceived to possess deep pockets.128  Plaintiffs 
now saw juries as worker-friendly, and corporations grew to 
fear them.  Ultimately, Congress, dissatisfied with numerous 
Supreme Court decisions in the late-1980s, enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which provided for punitive and 
compensatory damages, and thus more use of jury trials.129
Plaintiffs were not in the least bit concerned.  Indeed, 
they welcomed this development: 
  
All of this has meant that fears of juror bias in race cases 
have been submerged by the employer-employee divide 




 125. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).  Here the Court referenced 
its own landmark holding in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 
(1937), where the NLRA was held to be constitutional. 
 126. Loether, 415 U.S. at 197. 
 127. See Kerry R. Lewis, Note, A Reexamination of the Constitutional Right 
to a Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 TULSA L.J. 
571, 579–80 (1991).  
 128. See William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A 
Case for Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404 (1988).  
 129. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). 
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In employment discrimination cases, the annual number 
of jury trials has increased. . . .  In non-jobs [civil rights 
cases involving discrimination], over the twenty-eight-year 
period the ratio went from under two out of five to over 
three out of five.  The ratio in jobs cases much more 
dramatically increased: in 1979, only about one in ten 
trials was a jury trial; by 2006, jury trials were about nine 
in ten.  Compared to other plaintiffs, jobs plaintiffs prefer 
jury trial to judge trial.130
This is because the win rate for plaintiffs is 
“substantially worse in judge trials than in jury trials.  In 
numbers, employment discrimination plaintiffs have won only 
19.62% of judge trials.  While employment discrimination 
plaintiffs have thus won fewer than one in five of their judge 





  It is difficult to know why this is so, though the 
above-noted proclivity of juries to be unsympathetic to those 
with deep pockets cannot be dismissed.  Equally important, 
the judiciary itself appears less receptive to Title VII claims.  
In any event, this development constitutes one of the sharpest 
contrasts between the law and assumptions about protection 
under it today as compared to fifty years ago when the 
statute was first enacted. 
The developments to Title VII since 1964 are 
considerable. The professions, as well as supervisory and 
employment ranks, are more integrated.  There is more 
contact between the races.132
The administrative process debate seems to have been 
turned on its head, in large part due to developments under 
both the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII.  Even 
through seniority litigation, where the Court engaged in a 
contorted assessment of Title VII legislative history to deny 





 130. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 80, at 125–26. 
 131. Id. at 130. 
 132. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)   “Virginia is now one of 16 
states which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial 
classifications.”  Id. at 6. 
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Though the Supreme Court and the lower courts under it 
have become increasingly unsympathetic to plaintiffs seeking 
redress under employment discrimination law, juries, made 
available by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amendments providing for compensatory and punitive 
damages, have provided plaintiffs with something of a life 
raft.  The jury trial debate has been turned on its head.  The 
common law wrongful discharge actions which emerged in the 
1980s have made the jury an institution that can occasionally 
cabin judicial hostility. 
Progress in the war against discrimination has been 
made over the half-century, notwithstanding more societal 
inequality.  A black candidate for President has been elected 
twice, albeit with a minority of the white vote.  The world is 
different and in some respects better in 2014 as compared to 
1964.  But there are many who do not subscribe to 
antidiscrimination law.133
What then can or should be done next in the struggle to 
diminish racial considerations
  The challenge remains in the next 
half-century to unfold. 
134 in a truly post-racial 
society—and yet simultaneously tackle the societal and 
economic inequities recognized in both Brown and Griggs? 
Surely policies designed to reduce inequity135
 
 133. For example, even the Republican candidate for governor of Texas 
endorsed musician Ted Nugent after the latter called President Obama a 
“communist-nurtured subhuman mongrel.”  Manny Fernandez, Candidate for 
Texas Governor Stands by Outspoken Musician, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at 
A10; see also, e.g., Igor Volsky, South Dakota Lawmaker Says Businesses 
Should Be Able to Turn Away African-Americans, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 17, 
2014), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/03/17/3413901/south-dakota-lawmaker 
-says-businesses-should-be-able-to-turn-away-african-americans. 
 should also in 
 134. The Supreme Court has never found an affirmative action program that 
it liked.  Cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 U.S. 557 (2009); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  But see, 
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); cf. Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).  See also, in particular, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting), and Ricci, 557 U.S. at 608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 135. They will have to be considerable and comprehensive.  See, e.g., Eduardo 
Porter, A Relentless Widening of Disparity in Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2014, at B1.  Adhoc Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge, 
Labor & Employment Law Section, State Bar of California, To Strike a New 
Balance, reprinted in LABOR & EMP. L. NEWS (SPECIAL EDITION) 1 (Feb. 8, 
1984), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/ 
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all probability reduce racial divisiveness.136  The same holds 
true regarding legislation or policy protecting workers from 
all arbitrary treatment in the workplace.137
These steps are important prerequisites toward a road 
leading to a post-racial era in which administrative agencies 
and the judiciary focus upon arbitrary treatment under a 
standard where all consideration of arbitrary matters like 
race is itself arbitrary.  In 2014, that day is still a distant one. 
  Race, sex, 
national origin, religion, and the other grounds upon which 
discrimination is currently prohibited should not be the only 
basis for protection in the employment relationship.  For, 
after all, the current system induces non-meritorious 
complaints about discrimination (because they are virtually 
the only complaints which can be entertained outside a 
collective bargaining agreement), which are meritorious 
considered against a standard of fairness. 
 
259017/doc/slspublic/gould_strikeanewbalance.pdf (I was co-chairman of the 
Committee which authored this report addressing wrongful discharge actions, 
jury trials, and arbitration). 
 136. Cf. United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 
416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 137. See William B. Gould IV, The Idea of Jobs as Property in Contemporary 
America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. REV. 
885 (1986).  
